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Abstract
In this paper, we prove that two ￿rms can choose not to include a termination
clause in their partnership contract, thus inducing a costly termination in case of
failure of the joint project. This ex-post ine¢ ciency induces partners to exert large
non-contractible e⁄orts (investments) to decrease the probability of failure. Therefore,
the absence of a termination clause works as a ￿discipline device￿that mitigates the
moral hazard problem within the partnership. We show that writing a contract without
a termination clause is a credible commitment even when partners can add such a clause
in the contract in any moment of their relationship.
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11 Introduction
Strategic alliances, in the form of joint ventures (JVs) or looser modes of cooperation, are an
increasingly popular solution in order to reduce start-up costs, share risks, enter new markets
or develop new technologies. According to Dyer et al. (2001) the top 500 global businesses
have an average of 60 major strategic alliances each. During the nineties, the number of
alliances has grown at an annual rate of over 25% in the leading industrial nations and about
20% of the revenue of the largest US and European corporations comes from partnerships
(see Contractor and Lorange, 2002 and Harbison et al., 2000).
Even though the potential advantages of partnering are well known, the track record for
joint ventures is not a glowing one. Instability is a commonly recognized problem a⁄ecting
strategic alliances and the average life span of a JV is as little as four years (seven years for
other studies) with a failure rate ranging between 50 and 70%.1 Because of these prospects,
partners should be aware of the di¢ culties they may encounter in managing an alliance and
of the possibility of its early termination, when setting up a new relation. According to some
commentators, partners should approach JVs as Hollywood marriages; they should plan their
termination strategy from the very beginning by specifying in the initial agreement ￿what
happens to assets, customers and existing contracts in the (likely) event of a break-up￿ 2
Indeed, as it is well documented in the business literature, a non-amicable termination of an
alliance may result in very long negotiations, large expenses and bitter legal battles.3
Surprisingly, JV participants devote little attention to predict what happens in case of
termination of the alliance. A PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000) survey shows that less than
half of ￿rms entering an alliance have a formal exit strategy. Similarly, several authors have
observed that of the many aspects of alliance management, planning its termination ranks
among the most ignored by partners.4 Obviously, various might be the reasons for such a
lack. Just as a pre-nuptial agreement, discussing a termination clause when forming the
alliance might sour the deal; it might reveal the lack of trust of partners. In addition, also
di¢ culties in working out the various possible contingencies that might occur and designing
what parties should do in these cases may justify the absence of a termination clause in a
JV contract. A possible alternative explanation for such an absence can be envisaged in the
case of Concert. When negotiating the terms of their joint venture (called Concert), British
Telecommunications and AT&T explicitly decided not to include a termination clause. By
not determining the rules for separation, partners wanted to demonstrate their commitment
to the relationship.5
The model we present in the following sections develops formally this idea. We consider
1These ￿gures are taken from Gonzalez (2001) and Inpken and Ross (2001).
2￿Joint Ventures: Getting out Without Being Hurt￿ by A. Maitland, Financial Times 10th October,
2002.
3This point has been raised in many of the papers we are quoting in this section; see, for instance,
Gonzalez (2001).
4We refer, among many others, to Roussel (2001) and Chi and Seth (2002).
5￿Joint Ventures: Getting out Without Being Hurt￿ , Financial Times 10th October, 2002.
2two ￿rms that set up a joint venture to pursue a joint project.6 After signing the JV-
contract, ￿rms non-cooperatively choose the levels of e⁄ort (investment) to exert. These
e⁄orts (investments) determine the likelihood of success/failure of the joint project and we
assume that they are non-contractible.7 In case of failure of the project ￿rms terminate
the partnership and decide upon the allocation of the assets belonging to the JV. If the
JV-contract regulates the terms for termination then assets allotment takes place at zero
cost. On the contrary, absent a termination clause, partners start a (costly) bargaining
process to assign the ownership of the assets. We assume that partners have the possibility
of reaching an amicable settlement and, in case they fail to agree, they come up before a court
which takes the ￿nal decision. We show that in equilibrium partners do go to court with
positive probability thus making the bargaining costly due to the related legal expenses.8
The main result of our paper is that, under some circumstances, it is rational not to include
a termination clause in the JV-contract. The intuition for this result is simple; by not
including the clause, partners are making the failure of the project an even worse event: not
only they do not succeed in pursuing their project but also they generate a costly bargaining
process due to litigation before the court. This fact induces partners to exert larger e⁄orts
(investments). In other words, the absence of a termination clause works as a ￿discipline
device￿that alleviates the hold-up problem.
The crucial aspect when committing to a device that induces a costly bargaining relates
to the credibility of the commitment itself. In our paper, asymmetric information makes
the absence of a termination clause a credible commitment. Following the argument put
forward by several authors,9 we assume that partners are asymmetrically informed about
the assets￿value. In particular, we assume that only one ￿rm observes how much the assets
are worth; the attempt of this ￿rm to appropriate most of the surplus during the bargaining
stage induces the partner to reject an amicable settlement with positive probability so that
￿rms resort to court for the allotment of the assets.10
6In this paper we focus on the strategic e⁄ects of contract clauses when parties start a partnership, in
particular the e⁄ect of termination clauses on the partners￿behavior. However, here we will not analyze in
details why parties want to form a partnership, neither the reason why partners decide to form a partnership
instead of choosing di⁄erent organizational forms.
7Several papers, both empirical as well as theoretical ones, have highlighted the presence and the con-
sequences of the non-contractible nature of (at least part of) partners￿contribution (see Morasch, 1995
PØrez-Castrillo and Sandon￿s, 1996, Tao and Wu, 1997 and Veugelers, 1993). For instance, the ￿quality￿of
the researchers or labs that partners agree to assign to the JV is very di¢ cult to be speci￿ed in a contract.
These variables might be observable by partners while cooperating in the joint venture, but they might be
not veri￿able in a court and therefore not contractible.
8In principle, bargaining might be costly because of various reasons: the time spent by partners haggling
over the terms of the agreement or the payments to experts/arbitrators needed for evaluating the assets. In
the model, we focus on this second aspect.
9See for instance Chi and Seth (2002).
10The e⁄ect of private information on the design of the optimal property rights has a long tradition that
stems from the seminal papers by Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) and the fundamental works by Hart
and Moore on incomplete contracts and hold-up problems (see, for instance, Hart and Moore,1999). More
recently, Matouschek (2004) has formalized the idea that the ownership structure should be tailored in order
to minimize the size of ex-post ine¢ ciencies caused by private information.
3Review of the relevant literature
There are di⁄erent strands of the economic literature that are related to our paper. The
idea that the absence of a termination clause mitigates the hold-up problem is in line with
the ￿resource commitment￿argument put forward in the business literature.11 It is argued
that by devoting substantial resources to the partnership, ￿rms increase their level of in-
volvement and therefore they reduce the advantages of behaving opportunistically. Resource
commitment can be achieved in various ways. The governance form of the alliance is one
possible way and, in this respect, equity alliances are considered to require greater levels
of ￿nancial as well as organizational commitment than non-equity ones. The exchange of
￿mutual hostages￿ is another way to increase commitment and therefore to stabilize the
alliance; by bringing some critical assets (the hostages) to the partnership, parties become
more vulnerable and therefore less prone to behave in an opportunistic manner.12 Therefore,
with reference to this strand of literature, we claim that the absence of a termination clause
is a further way in which resource commitment can be obtained.
A relatively recent literature stemming from the paper of Cramton, Gibbons and Klem-
perer (1987) focuses on partnership dissolution; two are the main issues that are tackled:
i) under what conditions there is e¢ cient partnership dissolution (i.e. dissolve it when it
is e¢ cient to do so and assign the assets to the partner that evaluates them the most)?13
ii) what are the relative merits of commonly used dissolution clauses such as the so-called
Texas-shootout? 14 Our paper departs from this literature quite substantially. We consider
the relation between the e⁄ort (investment) decision made by the partners and the possible
termination of the alliance while the existing literature on partnership dissolution focuses
exclusively on the break-up decision.15 Moreover, we show that under some circumstances
it is rational to induce a costly bargaining by not regulating the terms for the break-up even
in case a simple termination clause would induce an e¢ cient termination decision.
The idea that it might be bene￿cial to improve ex-ante e¢ ciency (in our paper, larger
e⁄ort/investment) by imposing some ine¢ ciencies ex-post (in our paper, costly bargaining)
through the absence of a termination clause is similar to the one presented in a quite di⁄erent
context by Bordignon and Brusco (2001). These authors show that the lack of exit rules in
federal constitutions can be a commitment device; high costs of secessions (secessions are
11The literature on ￿resource commitment￿in strategic alliances is extremely vast. A comprehensive and
neat discussion on this issue can be found in Buckley and Casson (1988) and Das and Rahman (2002).
12Williamson (1983) discusses the use of mutual hostages positions as means to stabilize relationships. For
an application to joint ventures see Buckley and Casson (1988), Das and Rahman (2002) and Kogut (1989).
13See Fiesler, Kittsteiner and Moldovanu (2003) and McAfee (1992).
14In a Texas-shootout the procedure to assign the assets is such that one partner announces a price and
the counterpart chooses whether to be the buyer or the seller of the assets. See Brooks and Spier (2004) and
De Frutos and Kittsteiner (2004) for recent contributions on this topic.
15One relevant exception is represented by Li and Wolfstetter (2004) who consider both partners￿con-
tributions and possible termination of the JV. The fundamental di⁄erence with our paper and that of Li
and Wolfstetter is related to the assumption about the contractibility of partners￿contributions. While we
assume that they are not contractible, Li and Wolfstetter assume that they are so that no hold-up problem
arises.
4possible only by ￿independence wars￿ ) increase the stability of the federation, and therefore
the ex-ante bene￿ts of joining it. Even though the underlying idea is the same, the two
papers di⁄er for at least two fundamental aspects. First in Bordignon and Brusco (2001) the
lack of exit rules is a credible commitment to an ex-post ine¢ ciency (i.e. it is renegotiation-
proof) only if there exists a positive cost of renegotiation. Contrarily, in our paper the
contract without termination clause induces an ex-post ine¢ ciency even though partners
are allowed to reach an amicable (i.e. with no renegotiation cost) settlement. Second, in
Bordignon and Brusco (2001) parties never litigate in equilibrium (there is never secession
by an independence war). However, we want to explain why in reality we observe not only
contracts without termination clauses, but also partnerships which terminate with costly
litigations in front of courts.
Our paper is also related to the stream of literature which takes into consideration strate-
gic reasons for contract incompleteness. Non-contigent contracts as a signaling/screening
device are analyzed in Aghion and Bolton (1987), Diamond (1993), Hermalin (2001), Nicol￿
and Tedeschi (2003) and Spier￿ s (1992). Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that contracts
which contain some ￿gaps￿may help in establishing the appropriate incentives for parties.
In a context where certain actions are observable by parties but not veri￿able by courts, then
incomplete contracts that expand the set of discretionary choices/strategies may be used in
order to induce parties to coordinate on Pareto superior equilibria.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the main features of the
model. In Section 3, we derive the main results while Section 4 is devoted to check their
robustness. Finally, in Section 5 we present a concluding discussion. All the proofs that are
not essential for a clear understanding of the main arguments of the paper are presented in
the Appendix.
2 The Model
Two ￿rms, ￿rm 1 and 2, form a partnership to pursue a joint project. The project is a






while with probability (1 ￿ p) the project will fail . ki ￿ 0 represents
the investment level chosen by partner i = 1;2 and c(ki) =
￿k2
i
2 is the corresponding private
cost. ki can be interpreted as the economic value of the labs and researchers assigned by
￿rm i to the joint project. The quality of the assignments is not veri￿able and therefore
not contractible. At an intermediate stage of the project, after the investment levels have
been chosen, ￿rms observe a perfect signal of the future outcome, ￿ 2 f￿G;￿Bg, where ￿j
stands for the signal of outcome j; and may decide whether to continue or to terminate the
partnership. When ￿ = ￿G (where G stays for ￿good￿ ) ￿rms know that the project will
generate a monetary value vG = v provided that the partnership is continued and 0 in case
of early termination at the intermediate stage. When ￿ = ￿B (where B stays for ￿bad￿ )
they know that the project will generate a monetary value vB = 0.
Firms￿collaboration generates some intermediate result which is incorporated in an in-
5divisible asset A. If ￿rms choose to continue the partnership then the asset is devoted to the
joint project. If ￿rms decide for an early termination of the partnership the asset can be ac-
quired by one of them and used for its own business. We assume that the asset has a positive
private value for one ￿rm only, that is either ’1 = 0 and ’2 > 0 or ’1 > 0 and ’2 = 0; and
that the two events occur with equal probability independently from the realization of the
outcome or the investment levels.16 Moreover, we assume that when the private evaluation
of ￿rm i = 1;2 is positive, it can take value ’i 2
￿
’H;’L￿
with ’H > ’L > 0 and that each
realization is equally likely and independent from the outcome or the investment levels. In
what follows we let E[’] ￿
’H+’L
2 .
Information structure and timing
We assume that the signal ￿ and the investment levels ki, i = 1;2, are observed by both
￿rms even though they are not veri￿able, that is, non-observable by third parties. The only
source of asymmetric information between the two ￿rms relies on the private value of the
asset, since ￿rm i for which ’i = 0 does not observe whether the counterpart￿ s private value
is ’H or ’L.
The exact timing of the game is as follows.
At time t = 0 partners decide upon the terms of their partnership contract. The contract
speci￿es how ￿rms share the monetary value generated by the project and might include a
termination clause; this last clause determines who has the right to terminate the partnership
and the rules for allocating the asset A. If the contract is silent on some aspects, the
commercial law directly completes the contract in some cases (for instance the law determines
who has the right to terminate the partnership) while in other cases parties have to go in
front of a court to settle their controversies. The cost of writing and modifying the contract
is ￿xed and equal to ", which is positive but arbitrarily small.17 After agreeing on the terms
of the contract, partners simultaneously choose the investment levels.
At time t = 1, ￿rms observe the signal ￿ and decide whether to continue or to terminate
the partnership, in accordance with the contract clauses or, in their absence, with the law.
In case of termination, if the contract does not specify how to allocate the asset A, then
￿rms start a bargaining stage to assign its ownership. If parties do not reach an agreement
during the bargaining stage they resort to court which veri￿es the value of the asset and
decides how to split this value and the overall legal expenses 2F between the two partners
(we will be clearer on the rules of the court in Section 3.3). We assume that the court can
verify (estimate) the value of A and the monetary value of the project, but it cannot observe
neither the levels of investment, nor the signal.
At time t = 2 the monetary or private values are realized.
16We implicitly assume that the market value of the asset is nought. However, this assumption seems
reasonable, given that the asset is worthless for one of the two partners.
17We are interested in showing that partners can choose to not write a termination clause even when the
cost of writing such a clause is negligible, otherwise there are obvious reasons to observe contracts without
termination clauses.
6Throughout the paper we will assume that the following conditions are met:
(A1) v > ’H and ’L > 2F > 0;
(A2) ’H ￿ ’L ￿ 2F;
(A3) ￿ > v
2:
The ￿rst inequality in (A1) implies that it is e¢ cient to continue the partnership when
￿ = ￿G while the second implies both that termination is e¢ cient when ￿ = ￿B and that
￿rms are better-o⁄going to court to allocate the asset rather than disposing of it, when they
don￿ t reach an agreement in the bargaining stage. Condition (A2) requires the two possible
positive private values of the asset to be di⁄erent enough. In particular, it guarantees that
during the bargaining stage there is a meaningful asymmetry of information between part-
ners so that the proposer of the settlement has incentives to try to appropriate most of the
surplus of the relationship. Finally condition (A3) requires that the costs are ￿su¢ ciently￿
high; this last condition implies that partners will never choose investment levels so large as
to induce ￿ = ￿G with probability 1.18
The set of contracts
We denote with C the set of all possible contracts that can be chosen at time t = 0 by the
two ￿rms. In turn, a contract is a set of clauses which contains some or all of the following
provisions:
(i) the share s 2 [0;1] of the monetary value that ￿rm 1 receives at time t = 2 when the
project is continued (and (1 ￿ s) is the share of ￿rm 2);
(ii) an indicator function d which speci￿es which ￿rm has the right to terminate the part-
nership: d = i if ￿rm i only has this right with i = 1 or 2, d = 1 _ 2 if each ￿rm is entitled
to terminate the partnership unilaterally, and ￿nally d = 1 ^ 2 if termination requires una-
nimity;
(iii) the price b at which the asset can be acquired/sold in case of early termination of the
partnership;
(iv) the probability f 2 [0;1] according to which, once termination has been decided upon,
￿rm 1 is selected to choose whether to be the buyer or the seller of the asset at price b:
(1 ￿ f) is the probability that ￿rm 2 is selected.
3 Results
3.1 Benchmark: the Cooperative Solution
We start our analysis by de￿ning the cooperative (and then e¢ cient) solution. In order to
maximize the joint expected pay-o⁄ of the two partners, decisions have to be e¢ cient both
ex-post, at t = 1 once ￿rms have observed the signal ￿; as well as ex-ante, at t = 0 when
￿rms are uncertain about the success of the project.
18Relaxing condition (A3) complicates the presentation of the results substantially without adding any
interesting new insight.
7Ex-post e¢ ciency relates both to the continuation or termination decision and, in the
latter case, to the rules of allotment of the asset A. >From condition (A1), the ex-post
decisions are e¢ cient if:
(1) when ￿ = ￿G; the partnership is continued;
(2) when ￿ = ￿B; the partnership is terminated and the asset is assigned to ￿rm 1 if ’1 > 0
and to ￿rm 2 otherwise.
Ex-ante e¢ ciency imposes that k1 and k2 are set at the levels that maximize the joint
expected pay-o⁄; that is:
max
fk1;k2g









with probability p the project will be successful thus generating the overall pay-o⁄ v; while
with probability (1 ￿ p) the expected pay-o⁄ will be E [’]: From the ￿rst order conditions






; for i = 1;2: (1)
3.2 Ex-post E¢ cient Complete Contracts
Let us now consider the non-cooperative case in which each ￿rm acts in order to maximize
its own expected pay-o⁄ rather than the joint one. In this section, we focus on the set
of complete contracts (contracts that specify all the four elements described in Section 2)
that lead to ex-post e¢ ciency, that is, that induce the e¢ cient continuation/termination
decision as well as the e¢ cient assignment of the asset. We denote with Cepeff ￿ C the set
of complete and ex-post e¢ cient contracts.
We provide a couple of preliminary results which characterize the Cepeff set. The ￿rst
states that the price b at which the asset can be acquired should not be too large, otherwise
the ￿rm which assign to the asset a positive private value could prefer to sell it instead
of e¢ ciently buying it. The second, instead, states the conditions which induce an e¢ cient
continuation/termination decision and shows that these conditions depend on how the rights
to end the partnership are speci￿ed.
Lemma 1 Once termination has been decided, then under a complete contract there is al-







Proof. Suppose that the partnership has been terminated and call i the ￿rm that has






the asset is always e¢ ciently allotted, in fact: if ’i > 0; then ￿rm i prefers to be the buyer
rather than the seller since ’k ￿ b ￿ b for both k 2 fH;Lg; if ’i = 0; then ￿rm i prefers to
be the seller since b ￿ ￿b: Suppose that b >
’L
2 : when ’i > 0; since ’L ￿b < b; then type L
8ine¢ ciently prefers to be the seller. Hence, there is not always an e¢ cient allotment of the
asset in case of termination.
Lemma 2 A complete contract with e¢ cient allotment of the asset A, induces an e¢ cient
decision about the termination of the partnership if and only if the following conditions are
satis￿ed:
(i) if d = 1; then sv ￿ ’H ￿ b;
(ii) if d = 2; then (1 ￿ s)v ￿ ’H ￿ b;
(iii) if d = 1 _ 2 then sv ￿ ’H ￿ b and (1 ￿ s)v ￿ ’H ￿ b;
(iv) if d = 1 ^ 2; then the decision is always e¢ cient.
Proof. >From Section 3.1 we know that e¢ ciency requires continuation of the part-
nership in case ￿ = ￿G and termination in case ￿ = ￿B: Consider case (i); ￿rm 1 decides
to continue the partnership when ￿ = ￿G provided that: (1) sv ￿ ’H ￿ b; this ensures
continuation in case ’1 > 0; and (2) sv ￿ b; this ensures continuation in case ’1 = 0:






, (1) implies (2). Moreover, ￿rm 1 always chooses to terminate
the partnership when ￿ = ￿B since, by Lemma 1, it obtains b ￿ 0 in case ’1 = 0 and
’1 ￿ b > 0 in case ’1 > 0 rather than a pay-o⁄ of 0 that it would obtain by continuing the
partnership. A similar argument applies for case (ii) when ￿rm 2 has the unilateral right
to decide upon termination/continuation of the partnership. In case (iii) the e¢ cient con-
tinuation/termination decision is always taken provided that: (a) none of the ￿rms wants
to terminate the partnership when ￿ = ￿G; and (b) at least one ￿rm wants to terminate
the partnership when ￿ = ￿B: From the analysis of cases (i) and (ii) we know that (a) is







implies that both ￿rm prefer termination when ￿ = ￿B: In case (iv)
an e¢ cient continuation/termination decision is always taken provided that: (a) at least
one of the ￿rms wants to continue the partnership when ￿ = ￿G; and (b) both ￿rms want
to terminate the partnership when ￿ = ￿B: Condition v > ’H ensures that condition (a)
is always veri￿ed; indeed, consider the case ’1 > 0 and ’2 = 0; then at least one of the
following conditions sv ￿ ’H ￿ b, (1 ￿ s)v ￿ b is veri￿ed so that there is continuation. A
similar argument applies for the alternative case ’1 = 0 and ’2 > 0: Finally, as for cases (i)






implies that both ￿rms prefer to terminate
the partnership when ￿ = ￿B so that condition (b) is always met.
The next proposition characterizes the e¢ cient contracts in the Cepeff set; that is, the
contract that induces partners to choose the levels of investment that maximize their joint
pay-o⁄ given that the investments have to be incentive compatible and that conditions of
lemmas 1 and 2 are met.
Proposition 1 A contract is e¢ cient in the set Cepeff if and only if it satis￿es the equal
sharing rule, i.e., provided that s = 1
2 ￿ sC. The equilibrium levels of investment chosen by
partners under such a contract are ki =
v￿E[’]
4￿ ￿ kC
i ; with i = 1;2:
9Proof. See the Appendix.
The e¢ cient contract within the Cepeff set provides for an equal sharing of the monetary
revenues generated by the partnership: This result can be easily understood. From Lemma
1 we know that in case ￿ = ￿B the two ￿rms obtain the same expected pay-o⁄ since with
equal probability each of them is buyer or seller of the asset. Given the convexity of the cost
function, then it is optimal to share equally the pay-o⁄ even in case ￿ = ￿G.
3.3 Contracts with no Termination Clauses (NC-Contract)
In this section, we focus on the set of incomplete contracts which do not include a termination
clause. Such contracts specify only how the monetary value generated by the project is shared
between partners, namely s and 1 ￿ s. We denote this set CNC ￿ C.
Even though the contract is incomplete in several respects, some decisions are regulated
by the relevant laws. The identity of the partner/partners who is entitled to terminate
the partnership is de￿ned by the commercial law which may allow a unilateral decision
or require unanimity. In what follows we assume that unanimity is required to terminate
the partnership.19 What is not regulated by default by the law is how to assign the asset
belonging to the JV: who will get the asset and how much she has to pay for it. Therefore,
￿rms will decide the allocation of A in a bargaining stage which takes place once termination
has been chosen. Without loss of generality, in what follows we refer to 1 as the ￿rm for
which the asset has a positive value, that is, ’1 2
￿
’H;’L￿
and ’2 = 0.
3.3.1 Bargaining over Asset Ownership




and thereafter proposes a trading price ￿ at which it is willing to buy
A.20 The cost of making the proposal is ": Partner 2 can either accept or reject the o⁄er. In
case of acceptance, the terms of the proposal are enforced. In case of rejection ￿rms go to
court. We assume that the court uses the following rules.
The Court￿ s Rules The court veri￿es the value of the asset (i.e. ￿rm 1￿ s evaluation) and
then decides: (i) about the allotment of A, (ii) the compensation of the seller and (iii) how
the division of the legal expenses 2F. We assume that the court decision is e¢ cient, that is,
it assigns A to ￿rm 1. Moreover, it compels ￿rm 1 to pay the fair price (i.e. half of the value
of the asset) to ￿rm 2. Finally, court allocates the legal expences 2F adopting fee-shifting
rules based on pre-trial proposals. Namely, 2F is equally shared unless ￿rm 1 o⁄ered a price
￿ for the asset smaller than the fair one; in this latter case, the whole legal expenses are
19It can be shown that our results are not altered if unilateral termination is speci￿ed in the commercial
law.
20In Section 4 we consider the case in which ￿rm 2 makes the proposal.
10charged to ￿rm 1.21 This rule implies that the court wishes to promote amicable settlements
between ￿rms.
With a little abuse of notation, we let ’k denote ￿rm 1￿type when it observes that the
asset value is ’k, with k 2 fH;Lg: Moreover, we let ￿
￿
’k￿
be the probability that ￿rm 2
assigns to the event ￿￿rm 1 is of type ’k￿after receiving an o⁄er ￿: The next proposition
characterizes the equilibrium of the bargaining game.
Proposition 2 The unique PBE of the bargaining game which satis￿es the divinity criterion







2 with probability ￿ and
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2 it accepts the o⁄er;
￿if
’L
2 < ￿ <
’H
2 it rejects he o⁄er;
￿if ￿ =
’L
2 it accepts the o⁄er with probability ￿ and it rejects it with probability








2 , then ￿rm 2 believes that ￿(’H) = 1;
￿if ￿ =
’L
2 , then ￿rm 2 believes that ￿(’H) = ￿
1+￿:
Proof. See the Appendix.
As Proposition 2 shows the equilibrium of the bargaining game is semi-separating. Type
’L makes the fair o⁄er while type ’H plays mixed strategies: with probability (1 ￿ ￿) it
makes the fair proposal and with complementary probability it mimics the other type in
order to obtain the asset at a lower price. Firm 2 accepts to sell the asset at a price
’H
2 while
21Fee-shifting rules are used in many legislation (as Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures in
the United States). These rules provide strong incentives to parties in order to avoid costly litigations in
front of the court and to induce them to reach a (costless) agreement. Indeed, Spier (1994) proves that ￿if
litigants are asymetrically informed about the merits of the case, then fee shifting rules that are based upon
the settlement o⁄ers made before the trial have powerful incentive properties￿ . Therefore they are the most
unfovourable rules in order to prove that partners do not reach an agreement in the bargaining stage.
11when
’L
2 is o⁄ered it randomizes between accepting and rejecting the proposal. This last
fact implies that in equilibrium there is a positive probability that a proposal is rejected and
that parties solve their dispute in front of the court; when this happens, there is an ex-post
ine¢ ciency: in order to assign the asset parties incur an additional cost 2F; that is, the legal
expenses.
The equilibrium characterized in the Proposition 2 is the on￿y one which satis￿es the
divinity D1 criterion. Given that we will employ this re￿nement concept several times, it is
worth giving an informal intuition of how it works. Consider that ￿rm 1 makes an out-of-
equilibrium proposal and consider any conjecture that this ￿rm has about how the partner
reacts. If it happens that, given any conjecture, type ’H ￿nds it optimal to deviate whenever
it is optimal for type ’L while the opposite does not hold, then the D1 criterion imposes
to assign probability 1 that the proposer is of type ’H. Loosely speaking, type ’H values
the asset the most and therefore he is also the one which would obtain the largest bene￿t in
case of acceptance of an out-of-equilibrium proposal. Hence, only type ’H has an interest
in making an out-of-equilibrium proposal for a su¢ ciently small probability of acceptance.
3.3.2 The E¢ cient NC-Contract
Given the equilibrium at the bargaining stage we can characterize the e¢ cient contract with
no termination clause, that is, in the set CNC.
Proposition 3 A contract is e¢ cient in the set CNC if and only if it satis￿es the equal
sharing rule, i.e. provided that s = 1
2 ￿ sNC. The investment equilibrium levels induced by











i ; i = 1;2:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The e¢ cient contract provides for the equal sharing of the monetary values generated
by the project also in this case, in analogy with Proposition 1. Indeed, the two ￿rms have
the same probability ex-ante of acting as proposer (i.e. of assigning a positive value to the
asset) in the bargaining game which implies that they obtain the same expected pay-o⁄ in
case of failure of the project. The convexity of the cost function implies that it is e¢ cient for
the two partners to share equally the expected pay-o⁄ also when the project is successful.
The reason is that in a symmetric model equal sharing of the revenues gives to the partners
the same incentives to invest. Therefore it induces equal investment levels for the two ￿rms,
minimizing total costs for given level of total investment.
3.4 The Choice of the Contract
We can now compare the performances of the complete and incomplete contracts that we
have considered in the previous sections. The following result shows that, under some circum-
stances, the incomplete contract de￿ned in Proposition 3 outperforms in terms of e¢ ciency
any complete and ex-post e¢ cient contract.
12Proposition 4 The NC-contract of Proposition 3 Pareto dominates any complete contract
in Cepeff if:
v ￿
4F (12E[’] + 32￿ ￿ 3F) +
￿
’H ￿ ’L￿
(32￿ + 12E[’] ￿ 9F)
48F + 12(’H ￿ ’L)
Proof. The result is obtained by comparing the joint pay-o⁄that partners obtain under
the contracts de￿ned in Propositions 1 and 3 exploiting the fact that " is negligible.
Compared with a complete and ex-post e¢ cient contract, the e⁄ect of not including
a termination clause in the initial agreement is twofold. On the one hand, it induces an
ex-post ine¢ ciency given that with a positive probability ￿rms will litigate in front of the
court in order to assign the asset. On the other hand, the absence of a termination clause
has also an incentive e⁄ect. The ine¢ ciency due to litigation reduces the expected pay-o⁄
in case of failure of the project and this fact induces partners to make larger investments
in order to avoid the occurrence of the bad outcome ￿ = ￿B: This second e⁄ect emerges
by a simple comparison of the equilibrium investment levels de￿ned in Propositions 1 and
3.22 The main message of the above result is that it might be rational for ￿rms to write
an incomplete contract which will be completed in front of the court, bearing the litigation
costs. Costly litigation, induced by the absence of a termination clause, works as a ￿discipline
device￿that mitigates the moral hazard problem induced by the non-contractibility of the
investment levels.
4 Robustness of the Results
4.1 Complete Contracts with ex-post Ine¢ ciencies
In principle, also a complete contract can introduce some kind of ex-post ine¢ ciency as in
an NC-contract and therefore give correct incentives to the partners in the investment stage.
For instance, a very large price for the asset might induce some kind of ine¢ ciency in case
of ￿ = ￿B with similar incentive e⁄ects as the absence of a termination clause. Indeed,
with such contracts partners might reduce their expected pay-o⁄ in case of failure of the
joint project by inducing the continuation of the partnership or by assigning the asset to
the ￿wrong￿￿rm. However, the following proposition shows that complete contracts that
induce ex-post ine¢ ciencies are meaningless given that they are e¢ ciently renegotiated by
partners at time t = 1:23
22It can be veri￿ed that the investment is lower than the e¢ cient one both under the complete and the
incomplete contracts.
23Note that here, unlike the previous sections, we say that parties renegotiate (and not bargain) their
contract at time t = 1: In fact, we refer to bargainig as the attempt to reach a settlement when the initial
contract is ￿incomplete￿and does not specify termination clauses for A: For this reason here we prefer to
use the word ￿renegotiation￿ .
13Proposition 5 Any complete contract that induces some ine¢ ciency at t = 1 either
(i) is e¢ ciently renegotiated; that is there exists a new contract ~ c 2 Cepeff that both ￿rms
agree to sign at time t = 1; or
(ii) is Pareto dominated by the contract de￿ned in Proposition 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
An ine¢ cient clause is a credible commitment only if at least one partner rejects all
renegotiation proposals. In the proof we show that (i) when a complete contract induces
ine¢ cient allotment of the asset or ine¢ cient continuation (that is continuation when ￿ =
￿B); ￿rm 1 can always make a proposal (ex-post e¢ cient) such that ￿rm 2 ￿nds optimal
to accept this proposal when its beliefs satisfy the D1 criterion; (ii) contracts which induce
ine¢ cient termination (i.e. termination when ￿ = ￿G) with positive probability can be
renegotiation-proof. However partners never draw these contracts since they induce an even
lower level of investments than kC
i :
4.2 Less Informed Firm Acting as Proposer
In Section 3.3 we have assumed that the more informed ￿rm acts as proposer in the bargaining
stage. We prove that our results remain qualitatively the same when changing the bargaining
structure; namely, even if the proposer is the less informed ￿rm (i.e. the ￿rm which ignores
the exact value of A) ￿rms litigate in front of a court with positive probability in order to
assign the asset. In what follows we maintain the convention of referring to 2 as the ￿rm
which ignores the value of A; i.e. ’2 = 0:
Consider that ￿rms have terminated the partnership. The bargaining stage follows the
usual rules, but ￿rm 2 is the proposer. Firm 2 has three alternatives. The ￿rst is to make
no o⁄er at all so that the dispute is solved in front of the court. The second alternative is to
propose a selling price so high so that for type ’H can eventually accept it. Finally, the last
possibility is asking for a lower price, which can be accepted also by type ’L. The following
proposition shows that when F is not too large, then ￿rm 2 prefers to make no proposal so
that partners always resort to court in case of termination.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the less informed ￿rm is the proposer of a settlement in the bar-






+"; it makes no proposal and then, in case of termination,
the asset A is always assigned by the court.
Proof. Let ￿ denote ￿rm 2￿ s proposal. Firm 2 knows that by not making any proposal
it obtains an expected pay-o⁄ E[’k]￿F since the assignation of the asset is decided by the
court. Therefore the only sensible proposals for ￿rm 2 are those such that b￿" ￿ E[’k]￿F:
Type ’H accepts a proposal if and only if ￿ ￿
’H
2 ; since if ￿ is larger than
’H
2 all the
litigation costs are borne by the the proposer, while if it rejects such a proposal it obtains
’H
2 ￿ F. Similarly, type ’L accepts a proposal if and only if b ￿
’L
2 : Firm 2 either proposes
￿ =
’H

















2 ￿ ": Therefore ￿rm 2 makes no proposal if and only if E[’k] ￿
’L
2 + " ￿ F; that







As shown in the proof of Proposition 6, when the court adopts a fee-shifting rule to allot
the legal expenses, proposing a selling price which is accepted by type ’H only is a dominated
choice for ￿rm 2. Indeed, by making such an o⁄er it will be required to pay the whole legal
expenses whenever type ’L rejects this (unfair) o⁄er.24 By proposing a selling price which
is always accepted by the partner, ￿rm 2 can ask at most half of the lowest possible value
of the asset (at most it can ask
’L
2 ) but it avoids the legal expenses. On the contrary, by
making no o⁄er at all, ￿rm 2 gets from the court half of the value of the asset but it pays
the legal expenses F with certainty. As shown, in the above proposition making no o⁄er is
the preferred option for ￿rm 2 whenever the F is not too large.
The assumption that the court uses a fee-shifting rule to assign the legal expenses might
seem at odds with the fact that, when making the proposal, ￿rm 2 ignores the true value of
the asset. The following remark shows that even when the court adopts other rules to assign
the legal expenses, then still partners go to court whenever F is not too large.25
Remark 1 Suppose that the court￿ s rule is such that each litigant always bears half of the
overall legal expenses (the so-called American Rule ). In this case, the less informed ￿rm
either asks for ￿ =
’H














2 ￿ "; since
the proposal is accepted by type ’H only; or it asks for ￿ =
’L
2 + F and expects
’L
2 + F ￿ "






, the less informed ￿rm
proposes ￿ =
’H
2 +F so that parties go to court whenever ￿rm 1 is of type ’L; that is, when
￿ = ￿B they go to court with probability 1
2.26
4.3 Renegotiation between t = 0 and t = 1
So far we allowed partners to ￿complete￿(i.e. agree upon a price for the asset) their NC-
contract only once the partnership has been terminated. However, in principle, renegotiation
could take place at other points in time. In particular, the possibility of renegotiating the
initial contract after having chosen the level of investment and before observing ￿ (i.e. after
t = 0 and before t = 1) might undermine the discipline device properties of a NC-contract.
24The fee-shifting rule that we have speci￿ed in Section 3.3.1 does not require the court to verify whether
the proposer has observed the true value of the asset or not. As shown in the proof of Proposition 6, this
rule implies that the proposer can be punished for not having o⁄ered the fair price even if it ignores the true
value of the asset (i.e. even if it ignores what the fair price is). Therefore, the rule can probably be justi￿ed
in case the court is unable to verify whether the proposer is informed and it is unaware of it. Under milder
assumptions other rules (as the one suggested in the following Remark 1) seem to be more reasonable.
25Note that this time parties solve their disputes in front of the court because ￿rm 2 asks for such a large
price that only type ’H is willing to accept.
26Making no proposal ￿rm 2 expects
E[’]




15At this time, partners do not face the moral hazard problem any longer and therefore it
would be e¢ cient for them to agree on a termination clause in order to avoid the possible
costly litigation.
In Proposition 7 we show that if there exists a positive (in￿nitely small) probability that,
between t = 0 and t = 1; one of the two ￿rms has of already observed its private valuation
of the the asset A; then parties do not complete their contract signing an ex-post e¢ cient
contract. In particular, we assume that at the time of renegotiation three events might
have occurred: (i) with probability ￿
2 ￿rm 1 only observed its private valuation of the asset
(either ’1 = 0; ’1 = ’H or ’1 = ’L), (ii) with probability ￿
2 ￿rm 2 only observed its private
valuation of the asset (either ’2 = 0; ’2 = ’H or ’2 = ’L), (iii) with probability (1 ￿ ￿)
neither ￿rm observed its private valuation of the asset, where ￿ is positive but in￿nitely
small.
We assume that the renegotiation is as follows. One of the two ￿rms proposes to amend
the initial contract by including a termination clause. If the proposal is accepted, then it is
enforced in case of termination. In case of rejection the usual bargaining stage follows when
the partnership is terminated. We focus on simple renegotiation proposals that induce e¢ -






: Indeed, from Proposition
5 other proposals are, in turn, not renegotiation-proof.
Proposition 7 Suppose that there is a positive, in￿nitely small probability that one ￿rm
observes its private valuation of the asset between t = 0 and t = 1; then there is a PBE
satisfying the divinity criterion D1 where the NC-contract is not renegotiated.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is the following. Suppose that ￿rm 1 makes a proposal. For any r ￿
’L
2 ;
then according to the divinity criterion, ￿rm 2 believes that ￿rm 1 has already observed
’1 = ’H and therefore it prefers to reject the proposal. Hence no proposal is made in
equilibrium.
4.4 Generalizing Distribution and Cost Functions
In the above analysis we have assumed speci￿c functional forms for the probability and
the cost of the investment. However, the results we have derived do not hinge on these
assumptions. The purpose of this subsection is to show that the fundamental result according
to which the absence of a termination clause has an incentive e⁄ect holds even when allowing
for more general functions.
In what follows we focus on symmetric partnerships i.e. partnership in which ￿rms equally
share the monetary bene￿ts generated by the project (s = 1
2). Moreover, we assume: (a)
that the investment game has an interior equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium such that both
￿rms make some positive investment and the probability of the outcome ￿ = ￿G is strictly
smaller than 1; (b) if the investment game shows more than one equilibrium, then ￿rms are
able to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant one.
16We call p(k1;k2) ￿ Prf￿ = ￿Gjk1;k2g and c(ki) i = 1;2 the generic probability and cost
functions. Furthermore, we indicate with c0 (ki) and c00 (ki) the ￿rst and second derivatives
of the cost function.
Proposition 8 Suppose that:
i)
@p(k1;k2)
@ki > 0 and
@2p(k1;k2)
@k2




iii) c0 (ki) > 0 and c00 (ki) ￿ 0; for i = 1;2:
Then in a symmetric partnership the investment level chosen by each ￿rm under an NC-
contract is larger than that chosen under a complete contract inducing ex-post e¢ ciency.
Moreover, both contracts induce underinvestment.
Proof. See the Appendix.
5 Discussion
In this last section, we discuss some of the assumptions we made all through the paper.
Unbounded Penalties
In Section 3.3 we assumed that ￿rm 1 can only make simple o⁄ers in the bargaining stage:
a price ￿ to buy the asset. In principle, ￿rm 1￿ s proposals might be more sophisticated. Let
(^ ’1;￿;￿;L) be ￿rm 1￿ s proposal at the bargaining stage, where ^ ’1 is the asset value that
￿rm 1 announces, ￿ is the price for asset, ￿ is an exogenous random probability to go to
court and L is a penalty paid by ￿rm 1 to ￿rm 2 in case the court veri￿es that ^ ’1 6= ’1:
If the penalty L is su¢ ciently large, then there exists an equilibrium in which ￿rm 1 sets
￿ =
’1
2 and announces the true state of the world, ￿rm 2 accepts the proposal and therefore
parties litigate in front of the court with probability ￿: The possibility of using penalties in
the bargaining stage makes the contract without termination clause a less e⁄ective device,
even though it can be shown that ￿ can be set equal to 0 only if L goes to in￿nity, in order
to have the truthful revelation equilibrium. Nevertheless, contracts with large penalties are
not always feasible or ex-post e¢ cient. This is the case for instance when ￿rms have limited
liability, or when they are risk averse and courts have not a perfect veri￿cation technology
(they can rule that ^ ’1is di⁄erent from the true asset value even if a ￿rm reports truthfully,
i.e. ^ ’1 = ’1). Moreover, in many legislations such contracts are not enforceable in front of
a court, even though there exists a huge debate in the law and economics literature about
the rationales for such limitation to the will of parties (see for instance the seminal works on
liquidated damages by Shavell, 1980 and Rogerson, 1984 and for more recent contributions
Aghion and Hermalin, 1990, Chung, 1992 and Che and Chung, 1999). With respect to this
point, one may also interpret the result of our paper as a further argument that rationalizes
the non-enforceability of unbounded penalties. Very large penalties reduce the frequency of
ex-post litigation, but a certain amount of litigation is a useful discipline device to reduce
the hold-up problem, and therefore having bounded penalties may turn out to be ex-ante
e¢ cient.
17Courts￿Rules
In Section 3.3, we have assumed that, in order to allot the legal expenses, courts adopt
a fee shifting rule based on the bargaining proposals. As said, these rules make it easier for
parties to reach an amicable settlement without resorting to court and therefore strengthen
our result. Many other rules may be taken into consideration. For instance we could have
considered a two-sided rule which charges all legal expenses to the proposer of an unfair
proposal or to the party which rejects a fair one, or we could have employed the ￿American
rule￿ according to which legal expenses are always split equally. In both cases the one
described in Proposition 2 is still an equilibrium even though it is not unique. Di⁄erent
equilibria arise with di⁄erent rules, but our argument generally holds: litigation in front of
the court appears as an equilibrium phenomenon in all of them.
Contracting with Third Parties
In the paper we have disregarded the possibility for partners to sign contracts involving
third parties. The main motivation for this choice is that such contracts do not seem useful in
order to mitigate the hold-up problem faced by partners. For instance, consider a contract
according to which partners commit to a large payment to a third party (e.g. a charity)
in case of termination of the partnership. This contract would decrease the pay-o⁄ that
partners obtain in case of failure of the project thus involving an incentive e⁄ect similar to
that created by the contract without termination clause. However, this decrease in partners￿
pay-o⁄is not credible given that ex-post there is a trivial way of avoiding the large payment
to the third party once they have observed ￿ = ￿B: partners can formally continue their
alliance even though, de facto, they have abandoned it.
Asset Value
All through the paper we have assumed that the value of the asset does not depend
on the investment levels chosen by the partners but rather it is exogenously determined by
Nature. This assumption greatly simpli￿es the analysis and it formalizes the idea that the
fundamental aim of partners is to carry out the joint project so that the incentives to invest
in the alliance are mainly driven by the share of the monetary value v generated by the
project to which each partner is entitled.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition1
Consider an ex-post e¢ cient contract fs;d;b;fg: From Lemma 1 we know that in case of
￿ = ￿B ￿rm i = 1;2 obtains (E[’] ￿ b) if ’i > 0 and b if ’i = 0: Therefore, when choosing
























where, ￿1 = s and ￿2 = 1 ￿ s:







, thus the optimal investment




4￿ otherwise. The investment game has a unique
equilibrium but depending on the selected values for ￿1 and ￿2 it can have di⁄erent char-
acteristics: (i) only one ￿rm makes a positive investment or (ii) both ￿rms make a positive
investment. It can be shown that, due to the convexity of the cost function, for any equi-
librium of type (i) there is equilibrium of type (ii) which is more e¢ cient. Therefore we
consider values of ￿1 and ￿2 such that both ￿rms are induced to invest.




























Straightforward calculations show that the s = 1
2 solves the above program; plugging this
value of s into the expressions of the ￿rms￿investment one obtains k1 = k2 =
v￿E[’]
4￿ . ￿
Proof of Proposition 2.
The proof is in three steps. First, we show the strategy pro￿le stated in Proposition 2 is an
equilibrium. Second, we show that the out of equilibrium beliefs satisfy the divinity criterion
D1. Finally, we show that there are no other equilibria of the bargaining game that satisfy
the divinity criterion D1. Recall that we refer to 1 as the ￿rm for which the asset has a






















￿ F (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ "
since the proposal is accepted with probability ￿ and rejected otherwise. Any other proposal
smaller than
’H
2 is rejected and it is therefore dominated by ￿ =
’L
2 . Making ￿no o⁄er￿ ,
type ’L obtains
’L
2 ￿ F, which is less than what it obtains in equilibrium provided that
" is small enough. Any proposal ￿ ￿
’H
2 is accepted by ￿rm 2 but it is dominated since
’H ￿ ’L ￿ 2F(1 ￿ ￿) + 2":
Type ’H of ￿rm 1. The proposal ￿ =
’H
2 is accepted and ensures a pay-o⁄ of
’H
2 ￿ ". The
proposal ￿ =
’L





) + (1 ￿ ￿)(
’H
2
￿ 2F) ￿ ":
Type ’H is indi⁄erent between proposals ￿ =
’H
2 and ￿ =
’L
2 provided that ￿rm 2 accepts
the second proposal with probability ￿ = 4F




2 is dominated by ￿ =
’H
2 ; similarly, also making ￿no o⁄er￿at all is dominated by
￿ =
’H
2 provided that " < F.
Firm 2. Accepting any ￿ ￿
’H
2 is optimal since its rejection ensures at most
’H
2 . Consistently
with its beliefs, to reject any
’L
2 < ￿ <
’H
2 and any ￿ <
’L
2 is optimal for ￿rm 2 since in this
way it obtains
’H
2 from the court. When receiving a proposal ￿ =
’L
2 , ￿rm 2 believes that the
proposer is of type ’H with probability ￿
1+￿ and of type ’L with probability 1
1+￿. Therefore,











22that is when ￿ = 2F
’H￿’L: It can be easily veri￿ed that ￿ 2 (0;1) provided that ’H￿’L ￿ 2F.
2 Divinity criterion D1. First note that for any o⁄er ￿ <
’L
2 to accept the proposal is a
strictly dominated strategy. Similarly for any o⁄er ￿ >
’H
2 to accept is a strictly dominant
strategy and therefore beliefs over the proposer￿ s type are irrelevant.
Consider any o⁄er ￿ such that
’L
2 < ￿ <
’H
2 . Let ￿ denote the probability that ￿rm 2
accepts the o⁄er ￿: Type ’H prefers to make such an o⁄er than playing according to the







2 ￿ ", that is
￿ ￿
4F
’H ￿ 2￿ + 4F
￿ ￿H:












2 ￿F(1￿￿)￿". First, note that if ￿ >
’L
2 +F;
the intuitive criterion ensures that ￿rm 2 has to assign probability one that the proposer is
type ’H: For any
’L
2 < ￿ ￿
’L
2 + F we have
￿ ￿
2￿F
’L ￿ 2￿ + 2F
￿ ￿L:
One can verify that ￿H < ￿L : in fact, substituting ￿ = 4F
4F+(’H￿’L) and denoting ￿ =
’L
2 + z with 0 < z ￿ F; after some manipulations the condition turns to be equal to ￿
2F + ’H ￿ ’L￿
z > 0; which holds true. Therefore only the out of equilibrium beliefs
stated in the Proposition satisfy the divinity criterion D1.
3 Uniqueness.
To prove that there are no other equilibria of the bargaining game that satisfy the divinity
criterion D1 we need to check all possible equilibria: separating, pooling and semi-separating.
Let ￿k denote the proposal made by type k 2 fH;Lg of ￿rm 1.
A. Separating equilibria
A1 the two types of ￿rm 1 make two di⁄erent o⁄ers: by de￿nition of separating equilibrium
it has to be ￿H 6= ￿L. Moreover, ￿rm 2 has to accept both o⁄ers otherwise the type
whose o⁄er is rejected would prefer to make ￿no proposal￿and save ". However, the
proposed one cannot be an equilibrium since the type whose equilibrium o⁄er is the
largest prefers to deviate and mimic the other type;
A2 type ’H makes ￿no proposal￿while type ’L proposes ￿L: in such an equilibrium ￿L
has to satisfy the following conditions: ￿L ￿
’L
2 , otherwise the proposal is rejected
and type ’L is better-o⁄ making ￿no proposal￿ ; ￿L ￿
’L
2 + F ￿ ", otherwise type ’L
prefers to make ￿no proposal￿ . However, this cannot be an equilibrium since type ’H
prefers to propose ￿L rather than to make ￿no proposal￿ ;
23A3 type ’L makes ￿no proposal￿ , while type ’H proposes ￿H: in such an equilibrium it
has to be ￿H =
’H
2 . Indeed, ￿H reveals that ￿rm 1 is of type ’H and ￿rm accepts if and
only if ￿H ￿
’H
2 . Given this fact, it is optimal for type ’H to propose
’H
2 . Moreover,
for this to be an equilibrium, ￿rm 2 has to reject any o⁄er smaller than
’H
2 . This is
the case provided that ￿rm 2 assigns a positive probability to type ’H when observing
a proposal ￿ <
’H








that the divinity criterion D1 imposes that ￿(’H j ￿ = ~ ￿) = 0: Hence given these
beliefs ￿rm 2 should accept proposal ￿ and type ’L would be better-o⁄ o⁄ering such








￿ be the probability that ￿rm 2 accepts the proposal. The minimal probability for
which type ’H prefers to make such a proposal rather than o⁄ering
’H
2 according to











’H ￿ 2~ ￿ + 4F
￿ ￿H:
The minimal probability for which type ’L prefers to o⁄er ~ ￿ rather than, as required











’L ￿ 2~ ￿ + 2F
￿ ￿L:
For " small enough it follows that ￿L < ￿H: Hence the divinity criterion D1 imposes
￿(’H j ￿ = ~ ￿) = 0.
B. Semi-separating equilibria
As ￿rst we prove that we can have a semi-separating equilibrium only in the case in which
type ’H randomizes between two di⁄erent proposals and type ’L makes only a proposal.
Then we prove that within this class of equilibria only the one stated in Proposition 2 survives
to the scrutiny of the divinity criterion D1.
B1 There exists no equilibrium in which type ’H plays ￿no o⁄er￿with strictly positive
probability: making no o⁄er type ’H obtains
’H
2 ￿ F. This is a dominated strategy
since an o⁄er
’H
2 is accepted by ￿rm 2 and guarantees a pay-o⁄
’H
2 ￿ " to type ’H;
B2 There exists no equilibrium in which type ’L plays ￿no o⁄er￿with strictly positive
probability: to check that this claim is true we need to consider two cases:
￿ type ’L plays ￿no o⁄er￿with probability 1. This cannot be the case since (by
de￿nition of semi-separating) this implies that type ’H plays mixed strategies
randomizing between ￿no o⁄er￿and some o⁄er ￿. However, this cannot be true
by what we have proven in the previous point B1;
24￿ type ’L plays mixed strategies randomizing between￿no o⁄er￿and an o⁄er ￿.





2 + F ￿ "
i
since otherwise ￿no o⁄er￿would dom-
inate ￿. Type ’L is indi⁄erent between playing ￿no o⁄er￿and ￿ if the latter
o⁄er is accepted by ￿rm 2 with probability ￿ such that
’L










￿ ", that is ￿ = "
’L+2F￿2￿. In a semi-separating equilib-
rium type ’H should make the same o⁄er ￿ as type ’L. However, it is easy
to check that type ’H prefers o⁄ering
’H
2 rather than ￿; indeed
’H










￿" if and only if 4F > "
’L+2F￿2￿
￿
’H + 4F ￿ 2￿
￿
which is certainly true for " small enough.
B3 There exists no equilibrium in which type ’L plays mixed strategies randomizing be-
tween any ￿ and ￿ + ￿. Suppose that type ’L plays mixed strategies randomizing
between ￿ and ￿ + ￿. Clearly it has to be that ￿ ￿
’L
2 and ￿ + ￿ ￿
’L
2 + F ￿ " since
any other strategy is dominated. We need to distinguish the following sub-cases:
￿ type ’H o⁄ers ￿. The o⁄er ￿+￿ reveals that ￿rm 1 is of type ’L and therefore it is
accepted by ￿rm 2. Therefore, type ’L is indi⁄erent between ￿ and ￿+￿ if and only
if the former o⁄er is accepted by ￿rm 2 with probability ￿ and rejected otherwise












’L￿2(￿￿F) . Given this ￿ it is easy to verify that type ’H prefers o⁄ering ￿+￿










if and only if
￿
’H
2 ￿ ￿ + 2F
￿
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ > 0 which is surely veri￿ed.
￿ type ’H o⁄ers ￿ + ￿. This cannot be the case since in equilibrium ￿ would be
o⁄ered only by type ’L and would be accepted by ￿rm 2. Therefore, both types
of ￿rm 1 prefer o⁄ering ￿ with probability 1.
￿ type ’H plays mixed strategies. First note that the two types have to randomize
over the same support. On the contrary both types would be making at least one
o⁄er that reveals their own types and all such proposals should be accepted with
probability one. But then this cannot be an equilibrium since there exists one type
who should deviate o⁄ering the smallest revealing o⁄er. Consider, hence, the case
in which type ’H randomizes between ￿ and ￿+￿. The proposed equilibrium has
to be sustained by the following beliefs: for any e ￿ 2 (￿;￿+￿), ￿(’H j ￿ = ~ ￿) > 0.
Indeed, if this is not the case then both types prefer to deviate and make such
o⁄er instead of o⁄ering ￿ + ￿. Call   the probability that ￿rm 2 accepts the
equilibrium o⁄er ￿ + ￿ and consider an out of equilibrium o⁄er ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿, with
0 < ￿ < ￿. Type ’L is willing to make such o⁄er provided that it is accepted at
least with probability ￿ such that
￿
￿
’L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)(
’L
2 ￿ F) ￿  
￿
’L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿






25Similarly, type ’H is willing to o⁄er ￿+￿￿￿ provided that ￿
￿





2 ￿ 2F) ￿  
￿
’H ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿





. Using the standard
arguments it can be shown that the divinity criterion D1 imposes to assign ￿(’H j
￿ = ~ ￿) = 0 when ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ is o⁄ered.
Finally, we have to check the case where type ’H plays mixed strategies, while type ’L
plays pure strategies. Obviously it has to be that one o⁄er is made by both types and another
o⁄er is made by type ’H only. In equilibrium the latter o⁄er has to be
’H
2 . Moreover, the
o⁄er which is made by both types has to be no smaller than
’L
2 to be accepted by ￿rm 2.
Let￿ s denote
’L
2 + ￿ the o⁄er which is made by the two types. Note that, the case ￿ = 0
coincides with the equilibrium in Proposition 2 and therefore we restrict the attention to the
case of ￿ > 0.





the former o⁄er is accepted with probability ￿ = 4F
4F￿2￿+(’H￿’L) and rejected otherwise.
Moreover, these o⁄ers are equilibrium strategies if ￿rm 2 assigns ￿(’H) > 0 when receiving
’L
2 +￿￿￿ for 0 < ￿ < ￿. However, in what follows we show that such beliefs do not satisfy
the divinity criterion D1.
Type ’H prefers o⁄ering
’L
2 +￿￿￿ rather than
’H




















2 ￿ ￿ + ￿ + 2F
￿ ￿ ￿H:
Type ’L prefers o⁄ering
’L
2 + ￿ ￿ ￿ rather the equilibrium o⁄er
’L





￿ ￿ + ￿
￿












+ (1 ￿ ￿)(
’L
2
￿ F) ￿ "
that is, if:
￿ ￿
4F (F ￿ ￿)
(4F ￿ 2￿ + (’H ￿ ’L))(F ￿ ￿ + ￿)
￿ ￿ ￿L:
It can be easily shown that ￿ ￿H > ￿ ￿L given that 2F +(’H￿’L) > 0 and therefore the divinity
criterion D1 imposes ￿(’H) = 0 when ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ is o⁄ered.
C. Pooling equilibria





2 is accepted by ￿rm 2 and guarantees type ’H a pay-o⁄
’H
2 ￿ ".























2 ): Consider that ￿rm 1 makes
26an out of equilibrium o⁄er ~ ￿ = ￿ ￿ ". To sustain ￿ as a pooling equilibrium, ￿rm 2
has to assign probability ￿(’H j ~ ￿) > 0. However, the divinity criterion D1 imposes
￿(’H j ~ ￿) = 0 and with such beliefs the one proposed cannot be an equilibrium because
both types of ￿rm 1 prefer to deviate. Consider type ’L. It prefers to o⁄er ~ ￿ rather




L ￿ ~ ￿
￿






￿ " ￿ ’
L ￿ ￿ ￿ "
that is:
￿ ￿
’L ￿ 2￿ + 2F
’L ￿ 2~ ￿ + 2F
￿ ￿L:




H ￿ ~ ￿
￿






￿ " ￿ ’
H ￿ ￿ ￿ "
that is:
￿ ￿
’H ￿ 2￿ + 4F
’H ￿ 2~ ￿ + 4F
￿ ￿H:
It can be veri￿ed that ￿ ￿L < ￿ ￿H provided that "
￿
’H ￿ ’L + 2F
￿
> 0 which follows by
assumption.
Both types of ￿rm 1 play mixed strategies randomizing between no o⁄er and ￿. Firm 2
is not willing to accept any o⁄er smaller than
’L
2 , while type ’L does not make any o⁄er
larger than
’L
2 + F ￿ ". Given that the o⁄er has to satisfy these restrictions, then type
’L is indi⁄erent between o⁄ering ￿ and making ￿no o⁄er￿provided that ￿ is accepted with











2 ￿ F, that is provided
that   = 2"
’L￿2￿+2F ￿  L. Similarly, type ’H is indi⁄erent between o⁄ering ￿ and making
￿no o⁄er￿ provided that ￿ is accepted with probability  













2 ￿ F, that is provided that  0 =
2("+F)
’H￿2￿+4F ￿  H. Therefore, the
proposed one can be an equilibrium only when  H =  L and this is not true for " > 0 small
enough. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3
Firm i = 1;2 anticipates that in case ￿ = ￿B it will be buyer or seller of the asset with equal



































































thus the optimal investment level of ￿rm i is:
ki (￿i) =
(





The investment game has a unique equilibrium but depending on the selected values for ￿1
and ￿2 it can have di⁄erent characteristics: (i) only one ￿rm makes a positive investment
or (ii) both ￿rms make a positive investment. It can be shown that, due to the convexity
of the cost function, for any equilibrium of type (i) there is equilibrium of type (ii) which is
more e¢ cient. Therefore we consider values of ￿1 and ￿2 such that both ￿rms are induced
to invest.
The (ex-ante) e¢ cient share of the monetary values solves
max
s



















2 (1 ￿ s)
2
Straightforward calculations show that the sNC = 1
2 solves the above program; plugging
this value of s into the expressions of the ￿rms￿investment one obtains that in case of an














Proof of Proposition 5




: We distinguish between two cases, according to whether the ine¢ ciency
occurs when ￿ = ￿B or ￿ = ￿G.
Case 1: Ine¢ cient decisions when ￿ = ￿B.We consider two sub-cases: contracts with an
ine¢ cient allotment of the asset A and contracts with ine¢ cient continuation of the part-
nership.
1.1 Contracts with an ine¢ cient allotment of the asset A
An ine¢ cient allotment of the asset occurs whenever the asset is not assigned to ￿rm 1.
Consider the case where b ￿ 0: Note ￿rst that in this case an ine¢ cient allotment of A might
occur only when the buy/sell decision is taken by ￿rm 1 since ￿rm 2 always chooses to sell
A: Therefore, we consider the case in which ￿rm 1 has been selected to choose whether to
buy or to sell the asset. Two cases are possible:
281. b >
’H
2 ;both types of ￿rm 1 prefer to sell the asset given that ’k ￿ b < b for both
k = fH;Lg. The expected pay-o⁄ of ￿rm 1 is b while that of ￿rm 2 is ￿b: In this case
the contract can be e¢ ciently renegotiated in the following way: ￿rm 1 proposes to
set a new price ^ b = ￿b: Provided that the proposal is accepted, then ￿rm 1 buys the
asset and obtains ’k ￿ ^ b > b for k = fH;Lg: Firm 2 is indi⁄erent between accepting
or rejecting the o⁄er and therefore accepting it is a best response.
2.
’L
2 < b ￿
’H
2 ; type ’H is willing to buy the asset thus obtaining ’H ￿ b; while type
’L is sells A thus obtaining b. The expected pay-o⁄ of ￿rm 2 is 1
2 (b)+ 1
2 (￿b) = 0 and
there is an ine¢ cient allotment of the asset with probability 1
2: The following proposal
is bene￿cial for both ￿rms and leads to an e¢ cient allotment of the asset: ￿rm 1
proposes to set a new price ^ b = 0: More precisely, the (pooling) equilibrium is such
that ￿rm 1 o⁄ers ^ b = 0 independently of its type and ￿rm 2 accepts this proposal.
Note that, independently of its beliefs, ￿rm 2 rejects any renegotiation proposal ^ b < 0.
Finally suppose that the initial contract speci￿es a negative price for acquiring the
asset: b < 0: In this case there is ine¢ cient allotment of the asset whenever ￿rm 2
takes the buy/sell decision. Indeed, ￿rm 2 ine¢ ciently buys the asset and the pay-o⁄
of ￿rm 1 and 2 is ￿b and b respectively. This contract can be e¢ ciently renegotiated
in the following way: ￿rm 1 propose ^ f = 1; ^ b = 0 and pays ￿b to ￿rm 2 conditional
upon acceptance of the proposal.
1.2 Contracts with ine¢ cient continuation of the partnership
An ine¢ cient continuation of the partnership occurs whenever a ￿rm which can veto the
termination of the partnership prefers to continue it when ￿ = ￿B.
1. Firm 2 prefers to continue the partnership. Suppose that ￿rm 2 prefers to continue the
partnership once ￿ = ￿B occurred. Then both ￿rms obtain 0: However, the contract
can be e¢ ciently renegotiated in the following way: ￿rm 1 proposes to include the
following termination clause: ^ d = 1;^ b = 0 and ^ f = 1: If the proposal is accepted, ￿rm
1 terminates the partnership and buys the asset at price ^ b = 0; therefore its expected
pay-o⁄ is ’k > 0 for both k = fH;Lg: Firm 2 is indi⁄erent between accepting or
rejecting the proposal and thus accepting is optimal.
2. Firm 1 prefers to continue the partnership. Consider that ￿ = ￿B occurred. We need
to consider two subcases.
(a) Both types of ￿rm 1 prefer to continue the partnership (this happens for instance
when d = 1; b > ’H and f = 0) and then both ￿rms expect to obtain 0: In
this case the initial contract can be e¢ ciently renegotiated in the following way:
￿rm 1 proposes to include the following clause: ^ d = 1;^ b = 0 and ^ f = 1: If the
proposal is accepted, ￿rm 1 terminates the partnership and buys the asset at the
price ^ b = 0; therefore its expected pay-o⁄ is ’k for both k = fH;Lg: Firm 2 is
indi⁄erent between accepting or rejecting the proposal and thus accepting it is
optimal.
29(b) Only type ’L prefers to continue the partnership (this happens for instance when
d = 1; ’L < b ￿ ’H and f = 0). In this case ￿rm 2 expects to obtain b
2 and the
partnership is ine¢ ciently continued with probability 1
2: The following proposal
by ￿rm 1 eliminates this ine¢ ciency: ^ d = 1; ^ b = b
2 and ^ f = 1: More precisely,
the (pooling) equilibrium is the following. Independently of its type, ￿rm 1 o⁄ers
^ b = b
2; ￿rm 2 accepts ^ b = b
2 and any ^ b ￿ b; and rejects otherwise. Firm 2 believes
that ￿
￿
’H j ^ b 6= b
2
￿
= 1 and ￿
￿




2. Consider ￿rm 1: According to
the equilibrium it obtains a pay-o⁄ equal ’k ￿ b
2 ￿ " for k = fH;Lg. O⁄ering
^ b 6= b
2 cannot be part of the equilibrium, since either the proposal is rejected or it
is dominated by ^ b = b
2: Making no proposal ￿rm 1 obtains a pay-o⁄ equal to 0;if
it is of type ’L; or equal to ’H ￿ b < ’L; if it is of type ’H; where b is the price
of the asset A in the original ine¢ cient contract (which is greater than ’L). Both
payo⁄s are less than the equilibrium payo⁄. Consider ￿rm 2. Firm 2 is indi⁄erent
between accepting the proposal b
2; and rejecting it. Moreover, accepting any ^ b ￿ b
is a dominant strategy. Finally, the equilibrium beliefs satisfy the D1 criterion.
In fact, let ￿ denote the probability that the proposal is accepted. First note that
to o⁄er ^ b > b is a dominated strategy for both types of ￿rm 1; ￿
￿




follows directly by the intuitive criterion if ’L < ^ b ￿ b: Consider any ^ b ￿ ’L; type
’H is willing to make such an o⁄er if
￿(’
H ￿^ b) + (1 ￿ ￿)(’







Type ’L is willing to o⁄er ^ b if
￿(’






Since ￿ ￿H < ￿ ￿L; the D1 criterion applies.
Case 2: Ine¢ cient decision when ￿ = ￿G occurred.
There is ine¢ ciency at t = 1 once ￿ = ￿G occurred when the partnership is terminated
with some positive probability. There exists at least one case in which such a contract is
renegotiation-proof. Suppose that ￿rm 1 has the unilateral right to terminate the partnership
(namely d = 1 or d = 1 _ 2), ’H ￿ b > sv and ’L ￿ b ￿ sv: In this case type ’H chooses
termination and type ’L chooses continuation. This contract is renegotiation-proof. Indeed,
the contract could be e¢ ciently renegotiated only if ￿rm 2 would accept a lower share of the
30pro￿ts in order to induce type ’H to continue the partnership. However it can be checked
that according to the divinity criterion D1, any proposal with a new share s0 < s is rejected
by ￿rm 2 since it assigns probability one that the proposer is type ’L. Therefore whenever
￿rm 1 is of type ’H there is ine¢ cient termination when ￿ = ￿G occurred. Nevertheless, we
show that the contract de￿ned in Proposition 1 Pareto dominates any contract which induces
ine¢ cient termination with positive probability. Let ￿ the probability that the partnership
is continued when ￿ = ￿G and (1 ￿ ￿) the probability that it is terminated. In this latter
case the selling ￿rm obtains b while the buyer obtains ’i ￿ b. As shown in the ￿rst part
of this proof the contract either provides for an e¢ cient termination and allotment of the
asset or it is e¢ ciently renegotiated when ￿ = ￿B: Suppose that parties wrote a contract
that induces ine¢ cient termination with probability (1 ￿ ￿) when ￿ = ￿G. Then ￿rm 1 and
￿rm 2 choose k1 and k2 in order to maximize:
p
￿

















































and check that k1 (s;￿)+k2 (s;￿) is increasing in ￿. This means that the overall investment
(and the probability of ￿ = ￿G) is largest if there is always e¢ cient continuation when ￿ = ￿G.
￿
Proof of Proposition 7
First we show that there exist a PBE in which the initial contract is not renegotiated;
afterwords we show that the beliefs that support such equilibriumsatisfy the divinity criterion
D1. Let ￿i denote the type of ￿rm i that has not observed its valuation of the asset and
Oi, Li, Hi denote the type of ￿rm i that has observed that its valuation is 0, ’L and ’H
respectively and with i = 1;2. Without loss of generality, let ￿rm 1 be the proposer during
the renegotiation stage. Firm 1 can make no proposal or it can propose to set a price r for








Firm 1 does not make any renegotiation proposal; type ￿2 of ￿rm 2 rejects any renegotiation







27To prove formally this result we should specify what is the best response of types (0)2 ;(L)2 ;(H)2 when
receiving a proposal r: However, given that the probability that ￿rm 2 has already observed its type is
in￿nitely small what types (0)2 ;(L)2 ;(H)2 do is not relevant to characterize the equilibrium choice of ￿rm
1.






is the probability that ￿rm 2 is of type ￿2 conditional on the fact that ￿rm 1 is of type
￿1: Therefore, for ￿ in￿nitely small the probability of acceptance tends to zero and type ￿1
prefers not to make a proposal in order to avoid the cost of making the proposal, ": The
same argument holds for types O1;L1 and H1. Consider ￿rm 2. Given its beliefs, when it






type ￿2 expects to obtain r by accepting; by rejecting such
proposal it expects to obtain
’H
2 since in the ensuing signalling game it will face type H1
with probability 1. Therefore, rejecting r is optimal for type ￿2 given its beliefs.
Beliefs
We show now that ￿(H1=r) = 1 satis￿es the divinity criterion D1.






which is accepted by ￿rm 2 with probability
￿ is a best response provided that:




















Consider what happens in case ￿ = ￿B: If ￿rm 1 has made an o⁄er that has been accepted,
then it will buy the asset at the price r: If the proposal has been rejected, then ￿rm 2 believes
that it faces type H1 and, in the ensuing bargaining, it will accept only o⁄ers equal or larger
than
’H
2 : On the contrary, if type H1 does not make any o⁄er then, in case of ￿ = ￿B the
equilibrium of Proposition 2 follows. Rearranging the above inequality, type H1 is better-o⁄
making a proposal provided that it is accepted with probability
￿ ￿
2^ "
’H ￿ 2r + 2"
￿ ￿H1
where ^ " = "
1￿p.






which is accepted by ￿rm 2 with probability
￿ is a best response provided that:


















￿ F (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ "
￿
:
Note that in this case if the proposal is rejected then in case of ￿ = ￿B, in the ensuing
bargaining game, type L1 does not make any o⁄er and ￿rms litigate in front of the court;
indeed, after rejecting the proposal ￿rm 2 believes with probability 1 that it faces type H1
32and accepts only o⁄ers equal or larger than
’H
2 : Rearranging the above inequality, type L1
is better-o⁄ making a proposal provided that it is accepted with probability
￿ ￿
2(F￿ ￿ " + ^ ")
’L ￿ 2r + 2F
￿ ￿L1






which is accepted by ￿rm 2 with probability
￿ is a best response provided that:
p(sv) + (1 ￿ p)
￿









































In case ￿ = ￿B; if the proposal has been accepted, then ￿rm 1 will sell the asset at the price
r; if the proposal has been rejected then type O1 knows that it is facing type L2 or type H2
with equal probability (note that, when making the renegotiation proposal type O1 knows
that it is facing type ￿1); therefore in case of rejection ￿rms will play the bargaining game
speci￿ed in Proposition 2, where ￿rm 1 is the ￿rm that receives the proposal. Rearranging
the above inequality it can be shown that type O1 is better-o⁄ making a proposal provided
that it is accepted with probability
￿ ￿
4^ "
4r ￿ 2E[’] + ￿(’H ￿ ’L)
￿ ￿O1
Finally consider type ￿1: This type of ￿rm 1 ignores the type of ￿rm 2 that it is facing;
conditional upon the fact that ￿rm 1 has not observed its type, then the probability that
￿rm 2 has already observed its type is ￿




. For ￿ in￿nitely small then only what type ￿2 is relevant. Therefore, type ￿1 is
better-o⁄ making an o⁄er r which is accepted by ￿rm 2 with probability ￿ provided that:
































































































Consider what happens in case of ￿ = ￿B: When making the renegotiation proposal ￿rm 1
ignores whether it will be the buyer or the seller of the asset. If the proposal is accepted, then
33with probability 1
2 ￿rm 1 will be the buyer thus obtaining E[’]￿r; and with probability 1
2 it
will be the seller thus obtaining 1
2: Similarly, in case of rejection of the proposal with equal
probability ￿rm 1 will be the buyer or the seller of the asset; in the former case, ￿rm 2 will
accept only proposals larger than
’H
2 while in the latter the two ￿rms play the bargaining
game speci￿ed in Proposition 2 with ￿rm 2 being the proposer. Finally, if no renegotiation
proposal is made, then the usual bargaining game of Proposition 2 is played with ￿rm 1 and
￿rm 2 being the proposer with probability 1
2: Rearranging the above inequality, one obtains
that type ￿1 is willing to make a renegotiation proposal provided that ￿rm 2 accepts it at
least with probability:
￿ ￿
2(4^ " + F￿ ￿ ")
2F + 2" + ￿(’H ￿ ’L)
￿ ￿ ￿￿1:
It is easy the verify that for " small enough ￿ ￿H1 is smaller than ￿ ￿L1and ￿ ￿￿1: Moreover,
￿ ￿H1 < ￿ ￿O1 provided that r < 1
8
￿
2’H + 4" + 2E[’] ￿ ￿
￿
’H ￿ ’L￿￿














Proof of Proposition 8
Consider a symmetric partnership where partners have signed a complete contract inducing
ex-post e¢ ciency. Then the equilibrium investment levels are kC
1 and kC
2 de￿ned by the
following system of equations:
@p(k1;k2)
@k1






































Similarly, the equilibrium investment levels chosen under an NC-contract are those kNC
1 and
kNC


















































2 > 0 with ￿ and ￿ de￿ned in Proposition 2.
The fact that ￿ > 0 implies that:
34@p(k1;k2)
@k1








































and therefore conditions i), ii) and iii) imply that kNC
i > kC
i for i = 1;2:










































then one can show that (v ￿ E[’]) > v
2 ￿
E[’]
2 +￿: Therefore, the same arguments as above
apply to prove that k
Coop
i > kNC
i for i = 1;2: ￿
35